Moktada al-Sadr, Emperor of Iraq

[Harlan Huckleby]

I think the fear that al-Sadr could be a future leader of IRaq was borne-out last week. He is much stronger militarily than the central government, according to reports, this surpised me. And also he has gone from zero political support in the South two years ago to being the most popular. He could do well in provincial elections next fall, and some say this is what the whole fight was about, trying to knock him down and out.

I just wonder if we are fighting a losing battle. Maybe we have to not support any side and let the country reach its own equilibrium.

[Freak Out]

Paltry results of Iraqi offensive silence U.S. withdrawal talk

Warren P. Strobel and Nancy A. Youssef | McClatchy Newspapers

last updated: April 01, 2008 09:26:19 PM

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration was caught off-guard by the first Iraqi-led military offensive since the fall of Saddam Hussein, a weeklong thrust in southern Iraq whose paltry results have silenced talk at the Pentagon of further U.S. troop withdrawals any time soon.

President Bush last week declared the offensive, which ended Sunday, "a defining moment" in Iraq's history.

That may prove to be true, but in recent days senior U.S. officials have backed away from the operation, which ended with Shiite militias still in place in Basra, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki possibly weakened and a de facto cease-fire brokered by an Iranian general.

"There is no empirical evidence that the Iraqi forces can stand up" on their own, a senior U.S. military official in Washington said, reflecting the frustration of some at the Pentagon. He and other military officials requested anonymity because they weren't authorized to speak for the record.

Having Iraqi forces take a leadership role in combating militias and Islamic extremists was crucial to U.S. hopes of withdrawing more American forces in Iraq and reducing the severe strains the Iraq war has put on the Army and Marine Corps.

The failure of Iraqi forces to defeat rogue fighters in Basra has some in the military fearing they can no longer predict when it might be possible to reduce the number of troops to pre-surge levels.

"It's more complicated now," said one officer in Iraq whose role has been critical to American planning there.

Questions remain about how much Bush and his top aides knew in advance about the offensive and whether they encouraged Maliki to confront radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr.

A senior U.S. lawmaker and four military officials said Tuesday that the Americans were aware in general terms of the coming offensive, but were surprised by the timing and by the Iraqis' almost immediate need for U.S. air support and other help.

One senior U.S. military commander in Iraq said the Iraqi government originally told the United States about a longer-term plan to rid Basra of rogue elements. But Maliki changed the timing, and the nature of the Iraqi operation changed, he said.

"The planning was not done under our auspices at all," the American commander said. The plan changed because "the prime minister got impatient."

There's no evidence, however, that the U.S. tried to dissuade Maliki from executing either plan.

"My instinct is that we knew but did not anticipate" that American forces would be called on to help, said Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden stressed that he's still seeking information from the Bush administration on the matter.

Another senior American military official in Baghdad said Maliki notified Army Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker less than two days before launching the operation.

"By then it was a done deal," this official said.

Biden, who'll hold hearings on Iraq over the next 10 days, spoke shortly before lawmakers were to be briefed on an updated, classified National Intelligence Estimate on security, political and economic trends in Iraq.

The apparent misjudgment of the Iraqi security forces' capabilities and the strength of Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, as well as the revived political controversy over the war, come at an inopportune moment for the White House.

Petraeus and Crocker are due to testify to Congress next week about the strategy in Iraq now that the 30,000 troops Bush ordered there in a "surge" are being withdrawn.

In the larger sense, "this is a reminder that nothing has changed," said a senior State Department official, who also wasn't authorized to speak publicly.

As if to underscore that point, Britain announced Tuesday that it's freezing plans to withdraw 1,500 of its 4,000 remaining troops from southern Iraq due to the failure of the Iraqi offensive to crush Shiite militias.

Bush already has signaled that, following the Petraeus-Crocker report, he'll order a pause in further drawdowns of U.S. troops in Iraq below about 140,000, which is slightly more troops than were in Iraq before the "surge" began.

As part of its post-surge plan, the Pentagon planned to reduce troop levels by one brigade a month, thin out its presence in Iraq and lean more heavily on Iraqi forces. But the Basra offensive has some in the U.S. military fretting that Iraq's forces, while better than they were six months ago, cannot fully defend their communities.

Some say that Iraqi security forces are entangled in the intra-Shiite battle for power in southern Iraq. The Iraqi forces that Maliki sent to Basra contained a large number of one-time fighters in the Badr Organization, the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which vies for power with Sadr's Mahdi Army.

"We're not going to stop the tensions between the Shiite camps. Those were there all along; we've just seen them emerge," said retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency and a longtime war critic, during a conference call.

Indeed, violence began rising in places where the U.S. military drew down its forces. The first brigade left in December from the volatile Diyala province in northeast Iraq. The U.S. military moved two battalions out of Baghdad to cover parts of Diyala and Mosul, a Sunni stronghold in northern Iraq, according the military.

Violence in the capital then increased, according to statistics compiled by McClatchy.

In January, civilian casualties and improvised explosive device attacks rose. U.S. military statistics showed that suicide vest attacks increased in January and February. The second brigade is leaving Iraq now.

According to icasualties.org, which tracks U.S. troop deaths, American losses rose slightly in March to 38, compared with 29 in February. Troop deaths also shifted toward the capital this year.

Biden said that the Iraqi offensive may indeed have been "a defining moment," but not in the way Bush intended. "The president may be half-right," he said.

McClatchy Newspapers 2008

[Joemailman]

I think the fear that al-Sadr could be a future leader of IRaq was borne-out last week. He is much stronger militarily than the central government, according to reports, this surpised me. And also he has gone from zero political support in the South two years ago to being the most popular. He could do well in provincial elections next fall, and some say this is what the whole fight was about, trying to knock him down and out.

I just wonder if we are fighting a losing battle. Maybe we have to not support any side and let the country reach its own equilibrium.

What happened last week is a prime example of why we need to get out of Iraq, and the sooner the better. You had the Shiite-led Iraqi government, backed by the United States, going after the Shiite-led Mahdi Army which wants the U.S. out of Iraq. The main reason these two groups are fighting each other is the U.S. occupation. As long as we occupy the country, there will be groups like the Mahdi Army that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government. I realize we can't just pack up and leave tomorrow. I just don't think there will peace in Iraq until we really turn the country over to the Iraqis.

[Harlan Huckleby]

You had the Shiite-led Iraqi government, backed by the United States, going after the Shiite-led Mahdi Army which wants the U.S. out of Iraq. The main reason these two groups are fighting each other is the U.S. occupation. As long as we occupy the country, there will be groups like the Mahdi Army that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government.

The Mahdi Army wants to U.S. out so that they can seize power in a miltary coup. That's been the story all along.

Recall that the Mahdi Army was a huge importer of Sears Black & Decker drills. They specialized in drilling holes in peoples heads and bodies before murdering them. And I'm not talking about a few instances, this is their signature. The Mahdi Army has cleansed 80% of Baghdad of Sunnis.

The provincial elections next fall are a HUGE deal. Right now, the provinces have little power, and they don't have much legitimacy. The elections next fall will really show which groups are popular and where. I think (finally) having those election will bring some measure of stability to Iraq. The frustration of the inept central government will be diffused by increasingly empowered regional alternative.

al-Sadr seems to be following a political tract now, he figure out this can work for him.

I agree with you in a general sense, U.S. has to be out for stability. I disagree with McCain's mention of a permanent presence. But your "sooner the better" I just can't buy.

[Harlan Huckleby]

The Smart Way Out of a Foolish War
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
Sunday, March 30

Both Democratic presidential candidates agree that the United States should end its combat mission in Iraq within 12 to 16 months of their possible inauguration. The Republican candidate has spoken of continuing the war, even for a hundred years, until "victory." The core issue of this campaign is thus a basic disagreement over the merits of the war and the benefits and costs of continuing it.

The case for U.S. disengagement from combat is compelling in its own right. But it must be matched by a comprehensive political and diplomatic effort to mitigate the destabilizing regional consequences of a war that the outgoing Bush administration started deliberately, justified demagogically and waged badly. (I write, of course, as a Democrat; while I prefer Sen. Barack Obama, I speak here for myself.)

The contrast between the Democratic argument for ending the war and the Republican argument for continuing is sharp and dramatic. The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for "staying the course" draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown and relies on worst-case scenarios. President Bush's and Sen. John McCain's forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of "falling dominoes" that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster, but their fear-mongering makes prolonging it easier.

Nonetheless, if the American people had been asked more than five years ago whether Bush's obsession with the removal of Saddam Hussein was worth 4,000 American lives, almost 30,000 wounded Americans and several trillion dollars -- not to mention the less precisely measurable damage to the United States' world-wide credibility, legitimacy and moral standing -- the answer almost certainly would have been an unequivocal "no."

Nor do the costs of this fiasco end there. The war has inflamed anti-American passions in the Middle East and South Asia while fragmenting Iraqi society and increasing the influence of Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Baghdad offers ample testimony that even the U.S.-installed government in Iraq is becoming susceptible to Iranian blandishments.

In brief, the war has become a national tragedy, an economic catastrophe, a regional disaster and a global boomerang for the United States. Ending it is thus in the highest national interest.

Terminating U.S. combat operations will take more than a military decision. It will require arrangements with Iraqi leaders for a continued, residual U.S. capacity to provide emergency assistance in the event of an external threat (e.g., from Iran); it will also mean finding ways to provide continued U.S. support for the Iraqi armed forces as they cope with the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The decision to militarily disengage will also have to be accompanied by political and regional initiatives designed to guard against potential risks. We should fully discuss our decisions with Iraqi leaders, including those not residing in Baghdad's Green Zone, and we should hold talks on regional stability with all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran.

Contrary to Republican claims that our departure will mean calamity, a sensibly conducted disengagement will actually make Iraq more stable over the long term. The impasse in Shiite-Sunni relations is in large part the sour byproduct of the destructive U.S. occupation, which breeds Iraqi dependency even as it shatters Iraqi society. In this context, so highly reminiscent of the British colonial era, the longer we stay in Iraq, the less incentive various contending groups will have to compromise and the more reason simply to sit back. A serious dialogue with the Iraqi leaders about the forthcoming U.S. disengagement would shake them out of their stupor.

Ending the U.S. war effort entails some risks, of course, but they are inescapable at this late date. Parts of Iraq are already self-governing, including Kurdistan, part of the Shiite south and some tribal areas in the Sunni center. U.S. military disengagement will accelerate Iraqi competition to more effectively control their territory, which may produce a phase of intensified inter-Iraqi conflicts. But that hazard is the unavoidable consequence of the prolonged U.S. occupation. The longer it lasts, the more difficult it will be for a viable Iraqi state ever to reemerge.

It is also important to recognize that most of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq has not been inspired by al-Qaeda. Locally based jihadist groups have gained strength only insofar as they have been able to identify themselves with the fight against a hated foreign occupier. As the occupation winds down and Iraqis take responsibility for internal security, al-Qaeda in Iraq will be left more isolated and less able to sustain itself. The end of the occupation will thus be a boon for the war on al-Qaeda, bringing to an end a misguided adventure that not only precipitated the appearance of al-Qaeda in Iraq but also diverted the United States from Afghanistan, where the original al-Qaeda threat grew and still persists.

Bringing the U.S. military effort to a close would also smooth the way for a broad U.S. initiative addressed to all of Iraq's neighbors. Some will remain reluctant to engage in any discussion as long as Washington appears determined to maintain its occupation of Iraq indefinitely. Therefore, at some stage next year, after the decision to disengage has been announced, a regional conference should be convened to promote regional stability, border control and other security arrangements, as well as regional economic development -- all of which would help mitigate the unavoidable risks connected with U.S. disengagement.

Since Iraq's neighbors are vulnerable to intensified ethnic and religious conflicts spilling over from Iraq, all of them -- albeit for different reasons -- are likely to be interested. More distant Arab states such as Egypt, Morocco or Algeria might also take part, and some of them might be willing to provide peacekeeping forces to Iraq once it is free of foreign occupation. In addition, we should consider a regional rehabilitation program designed to help Iraq recover and to relieve the burdens that Jordan and Syria, in particular, have shouldered by hosting more than 2 million Iraqi refugees.

The overall goal of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to undo the errors of recent years should be cooling down the Middle East, instead of heating it up. The "unipolar moment" that the Bush administration's zealots touted after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been squandered to generate a policy based on the unilateral use of force, military threats and occupation masquerading as democratization -- all of which has pointlessly heated up tensions, fueled anti-colonial resentments and bred religious fanaticism. The long-range stability of the Middle East has been placed in increasing jeopardy.

Terminating the war in Iraq is the necessary first step to calming the Middle East, but other measures will be needed. It is in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in serious negotiations -- on both regional security and the nuclear challenge it poses. But such negotiations are unlikely as long as Washington's price of participation is unreciprocated concessions from Tehran. Threats to use force on Iran are also counterproductive because they tend to fuse Iranian nationalism with religious fanaticism.

Real progress in the badly stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process would also help soothe the region's religious and nationalist passions. But for such progress to take place, the United States must vigorously help the two sides start making the mutual concessions without which a historic compromise cannot be achieved. Peace between Israel and Palestine would be a giant step toward greater regional stability, and it would finally let both Israelis and Palestinians benefit from the Middle East's growing wealth.

We started this war rashly, but we must end our involvement responsibly. And end it we must. The alternative is a fear-driven policy paralysis that perpetuates the war -- to America's historic detriment.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter.

[Harlan Huckleby]

Terminating the war in Iraq is the necessary first step to calming the Middle East, but other measures will be needed. It is in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in serious negotiations

I have trouble with people who call on the U.S. to "End the War." It is not in our power to do so. If you look at Iraq March 2008 and March 2007, it's pretty obvious we are keeping a lid on the violence.

Is there enough political progress to justify continuing our presence for HUMANITARIAN & STRATEGIC purposes? I had my doubts until recently.

[Freak Out]

You had the Shiite-led Iraqi government, backed by the United States, going after the Shiite-led Mahdi Army which wants the U.S. out of Iraq. The main reason these two groups are fighting each other is the U.S. occupation. As long as we occupy the country, there will be groups like the Mahdi Army that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government.

The Mahdi Army wants to U.S. out so that they can seize power in a miltary coup. That's been the story all along.

Recall that the Mahdi Army was a huge importer of Sears Black & Decker drills. They specialized in drilling holes in peoples heads and bodies before murdering them. And I'm not talking about a few instances, this is their signature. The Mahdi Army has cleansed 80% of Baghdad of Sunnis.

The provincial elections next fall are a HUGE deal. Right now, the provinces have little power, and they don't have much legitimacy. The elections next fall will really show which groups are popular and where. I think (finally) having those election will bring some measure of stability to Iraq. The frustration of the inept central government will be diffused by increasingly empowered regional alternative.

al-Sadr seems to be following a political tract now, he figure out this can work for him.

I agree with you in a general sense, U.S. has to be out for stability. I disagree with McCain's mention of a permanent presence. But your "sooner the better" I just can't buy.

The US military is going to be in Iraq for a very long time. Unless of course something dramatically changes. Troop numbers may drop but with the embassy and the permanent bases we are building as well as the agreements for the above with the Iraqi government we will have soldiers stationed there for some time to come.

[texaspackerbacker]

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This says all we need to know about Brzezinski. The crap he spews is nothing more than a grandiose description of the same old cut and run anti-American idiocy that both Dem candidates and most Dem politicians in general are pushing.

I agree with FreakOut that our military will be in Iraq for a long time--the 100 year line from McCain that the Dems are trying to demagogue. It will, however, be similar to our force deployed in Korea or Germany. We already have wound down our role in combat operations considerably. The presence of American forces in reserve should be enough to prevent the Mahdi coup mentioned. I'd really like to see al Sadr and his people co-opted and brought into harmony with the government, same as has been done with the Kurds and the Sunni tribes. A little bit of outreach of that type is not a bad thing--as long as we/our Iraqi government allies are dealing from strength.

Negotiating with Iran, as was suggested by either a poster or Brzezinski, is a bad idea. Rather, we should continue the Bush policy of aiding the anti-government elements in Iran, as well as keeping on the table intimidation and even the threat of taking out their nuclear program.

[Freak Out]

April 2, 2008

Advice of Iraqi, Now in Beirut Cell, Finally Heeded
By ROBERT F. WORTH

BEIRUT, Lebanon — More than a decade before the first American tanks rolled into Baghdad, Mudher al-Kharbit and his family began slipping out of Iraq to meet secretly with C.I.A. officials, pleading for help with their plan to unite Iraq’s tribes against Saddam Hussein. If that effort had succeeded, Mr. Kharbit or his older brother might have become the ruler of Iraq.

Instead, he sits in a Beirut prison cell chain-smoking Marlboros and reliving the past. A gaunt, worn-looking 52-year-old with warm brown eyes and an apologetic manner, he is one of the many people whose fortunes have been utterly transformed by the American invasion.

Yet even by Iraq’s tumultuous standards, Mr. Kharbit’s story is extraordinary. Once one of Iraq’s richest men, he repeatedly escaped death at Mr. Hussein’s hands, only to help shelter him — tribal hospitality required it — after the American invasion. He stood with a weeping Mr. Hussein in April 2003 after American bombs meant for the fleeing dictator had instead killed Mr. Kharbit’s brother Malik and more than a dozen other family members.

Now the Americans are finally taking Mr. Kharbit’s advice in Iraq, and working with the Sunni tribes to fight Islamic extremists, such as the group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. But it is too late for Mr. Kharbit, who was arrested here before the Anbar Awakening movement transformed America’s worst enemies in Iraq into its best friends.

“After the war, the Americans wanted me,” Mr. Kharbit said, smiling sadly, as if to explain his prison surroundings. “But the resistance is an honor I do not claim.”

Although some leaders of the Anbar Awakening — America’s new tribal Sunni Arab partners in Iraq — say Mr. Kharbit could bolster their efforts to fight the insurgency, he is not likely to get back to his native land.

Iraq’s Shiite-led government views Mr. Kharbit as a terrorist. And while the United Nations says the Iraqi warrant on which he was arrested here last year is baseless, and has called for his release, the Lebanese authorities cannot decide what to do with him. An official at the United States Embassy in Beirut declined to comment about Mr. Kharbit’s case.

So he waits in limbo, staring at the photographs of wounded and dead Iraqi children he has pasted to his cell wall. A haggard-looking man who treats his prison guests with elaborate hospitality, he says he has forgiven the Americans for killing his brother and his nephews and nieces, and for appropriating much of his family’s large fortune. The future of Iraq is what matters, he says.

Mr. Kharbit, who worked in the family’s thriving construction business before 2003, says he never took part in the insurgency. But he concedes that the facts of his life are murky and easily misunderstood.

He has a long history with Mr. Hussein, who helped make the Kharbit family rich in the 1970s through construction and oil contracts. Many Iraqis still see his family — which helped to police the Iraqi border for years and served as go-betweens with King Hussein of Jordan — through that lens.

“I think my story has never happened before in history, not anywhere,” Mr. Kharbit says with a smile that looks more like a wince.

In a sense, his predicament can be traced to the night of April 11, 2003, when he arrived back at his family’s palatial compound west of Baghdad to find the main house a heap of burning rubble. The American military had bombed it, having heard that Mr. Hussein was hiding there.

But instead of killing the Iraqi dictator, they had killed Mr. Kharbit’s older brother, Malik al-Kharbit — the very man who had led the family’s negotiations with the C.I.A. to topple Mr. Hussein.

The bombing also killed 21 other people, including children, and the fury it aroused has been widely believed to have helped kick-start the insurgency in western Iraq. That fact may have helped fuel American suspicion toward Mr. Kharbit.

But until now, Mr. Kharbit has not disclosed another crucial detail about the bombing: Mr. Hussein was, in fact, staying at the Kharbit family compound that night, with his two sons and his half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti. They were all in a smaller villa next to the one the bombs struck, and were not harmed.

When Mr. Kharbit arrived that night, he says he found Mr. Hussein weeping outside the burning building. The dictator’s son Qusay was struggling to rescue a wounded child from the rubble.

The Hussein family left soon afterward. American officials said they had not known that Mr. Hussein was there at the time, and the account came from Mr. Kharbit alone.

Later, Mr. Kharbit received a letter from the fugitive Iraqi president to thank him for his family’s hospitality, invoking an old Arab parable about a man who slaughters his wife’s mare to feed a group of guests.

Mr. Kharbit is quick to point out that his family was obligated by Arab tradition to shelter Mr. Hussein, and that the gesture was not a show of support. He is keenly aware of the dictator’s cruelties, he said, having spent years in hiding in the mid-1990s when Mr. Hussein suspected him of backing an insurrection.

“If Bush lost the war and came to my house, we would accept him,” Mr. Kharbit said. “We would do exactly what we did with Saddam; this is our way.”

In the weeks and months that followed, Mr. Kharbit says, he overcame his feelings of rage and betrayal, and tried to help the Americans rebuild Iraq. As the leader of one of western Iraq’s most important tribal families, he urged American officials to work with the tribes to secure peace. Some American military officers were receptive.

But the office of L. Paul Bremer III, then the administration’s top civilian administrator in Iraq, suspected Mr. Kharbit of being an insurgent sympathizer — or worse — and rebuffed him, said a former C.I.A. official who was in Baghdad at the time.

Mr. Kharbit soon moved to Jordan, in 2004, but Jordanian officials — acting under pressure from American officials in Baghdad — later forced him to leave that country, said the former official. Mr. Kharbit moved to Syria.

In 2006, Mr. Kharbit left Syria for Lebanon, seeking treatment for his wife’s brain cancer. By then, Iraq — now ruled by Shiites who were deeply suspicious of anyone with ties to Saddam Hussein — had issued a formal arrest warrant, charging Mr. Kharbit with financing terrorism in Iraq. That was the basis of the Interpol warrant on which he was arrested when he arrived at the Lebanese border.

Mr. Kharbit, who suffers from heart and liver problems, has been in a prison cell inside a Beirut hospital ever since. He still wears well-tailored English suits, a remnant of his salad days in Iraq, when he rode a Mercedes limousine from Ramadi to Baghdad every day.

But his money is running out. The American military took $7 million worth of gravel from a quarry owned by the Kharbit family and paid only $20,000 for it, according to Mr. Kharbit and some of his friends, who provided documents to support their claim. However, that is the least of his problems.

Late last year the Shiite-led Iraqi government nearly succeeded in having Mr. Kharbit extradited to Iraq, where he is wanted on charges that could result in the death penalty. But the Iraqi government has not made public any evidence for its claim that Mr. Kharbit had been involved in financing the insurgency.

And the Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon, Jawad al-Hairi, said in an interview in his Beirut office that he had heard that the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, might agree to drop the charges once Mr. Kharbit is back in Iraq.

The United Nations’ refugee arm, after conducting an investigation, declared Mr. Kharbit to be a refugee this year, saying that the Iraqi charges against him appeared to be baseless. But the Interpol warrant has not been reversed.

Some who know Mr. Kharbit and his family say he could make an important difference in Iraq.

“His absence in the Awakening is not good,” said Ali Shukri, a former general in the Jordanian military. “He could have a tremendous effect.”

Whether he returns to Iraq or not, some say Mr. Kharbit deserves better treatment.

“The Kharbit family was the early backbone of U.S. policy on tribes,” said another former C.I.A. officer who had spent time in Iraq. “It’s a bit odd that no one in the U.S. government really cares about him.”

[texaspackerbacker]

I read this article on Yahoo too.

He is correct on this one very limited point--that we were correct to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders to our side. I see that, however, as more a matter of those Sunni leaders seeing the light and coming in, rather than our suddenly beginning to try to bring them into the fold.

Beyond that, however, he seems like a leftover Saddamist who is damned lucky to be where he is instead of in Iraq awaiting execution.

And probably, it's better that way, because if the Maliki government had him executed, it night rock the boat regarding cooperation of the Sunni tribes.

[Harlan Huckleby]

Half of Iraq's educated people are "leftover Saddamists", and they're hunkered-down in Syria, driving cabs.

[Harlan Huckleby]

More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight
By STEPHEN FARRELL and JAMES GLANZ
Published: April 4, 2008
BAGHDAD — More than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen either refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts during the inconclusive assault against Shiite militias in Basra last week, a senior Iraqi government official said Thursday. Iraqi military officials said the group included dozens of officers, including at least two senior field commanders in the battle.

The desertions in the heat of a major battle cast fresh doubt on the effectiveness of the American-trained Iraqi security forces. The White House has conditioned further withdrawals of American troops on the readiness of the Iraqi military and police.

The crisis created by the desertions and other problems with the Basra operation was serious enough that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki hastily began funneling some 10,000 recruits from local Shiite tribes into his armed forces. That move has already generated anger among Sunni tribesmen whom Mr. Maliki has been much less eager to recruit despite their cooperation with the government in its fight against Sunni insurgents and criminal gangs.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/wo...st/04iraq.html

[texaspackerbacker]

The fact that it was a NY Times article says it all.

Inconclusive? When the Mahdis stepped aside--to save their skin, the Iraqi forces went in and arrested the leaders and pacified the members of the renegade militias. Basra is more peaceful than it has been since the Brits turned things over.

1,000 who refused to kill fellow Iraqis, possibly fellow Shi'ites out of 300,000 or so that the new Iraqi army is up to now is not too alarming. The mission got accomplished without them.

Do you know how you can tell when something is successful in Iraq? When you hear damn little about it in the mainstream media. That is the case here. The NY Times has pretty much gone so far to the left that they hardly even qualify as leftist mainstream anymore.

[Harlan Huckleby]

Iraqi Troops Say Control Basra Stronghold
Published: April 19, 2008

BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi soldiers swooped on the Basra stronghold of Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Saturday, saying they had seized control of his militia bastion where they suffered an embarrassing setback in late March.

The dawn raid by government troops on the Hayaniya district of the southern oil city was backed by a thunderous bombardment by U.S. warplanes and British artillery.

It came after more intense fighting in Baghdad between security forces and Sadr's black-masked militiamen. Police said 12 people had been killed in the Shi'ite slum of Sadr City and hospitals said they received more than 130 wounded overnight.

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's crackdown against Sadr's Mehdi Army militia in Basra last month was criticized by U.S. commanders as poorly planned and hasty.

It failed to drive the militia from the streets and sparked battles across the south and in the cleric's Baghdad stronghold of Sadr City. The government dismissed 1,300 soldiers and police for refusing to fight.

On Saturday by contrast, Harith al-Idhari, head of the Sadr office in Basra, said the militia had not put up any resistance, in observance of a ceasefire declared by the cleric.

Major-General Abdul-Karim Khalaf, an interior ministry spokesman, described the operation as a major success.

"Our troops deployed in all the parts of the (Hayaniya) district and controlled it without much resistance," Khalaf told Reuters. "Now we are working on house-to-house checking. We have made many arrests."

Maliki, himself a Shi'ite, has threatened to ban Sadr's mass movement from political life if the cleric does not disband the Mehdi Army. In response, Sadr has threatened to formally scrap a ceasefire he imposed on his militia last August, a move that could trigger a full-scale uprising.

[Harlan Huckleby]

I've come to conclusion that the government will have to crush Sadr and other militias militarily. Unfortunately. You can't move forward w/ democracy if you have political parties with powerful armies not under control of the regional or central government. It appears Sadir intends to seize power in the south, using provincial elections as a means to that end.

It's gonna be a very bloody summer, which is much in the interest of Sadr & friends. (They don't want to see McCain in office, I suspect.)

[texaspackerbacker]

What leads you to this conclusion about al Sadr?

I haven't heard anything about him since he tentatively agreed to disband his Mahdi Militia.

Al Sadr just might be one of the few Iraqis who wouldn't want McCain to win, because if we cut and ran, and the whole place degenerated into chaos or Iranian hegemony, al Sadr might eventually end up in power.

[Harlan Huckleby]

What leads you to this conclusion about al Sadr?

Just a guess. We learned in the last couple weeks that the militias in Basra area are no joke. They apparently have been trained in Iran, they used sophisticated, coordinated, battlefield tecnhniques and fought well. And they have high end weapons. Some of the Iraqi Army guys who retreated (deserted) said they did so because they were massively out-gunned.

As long as the militias control Basra-area, they siphon off a large percentage of total oil wealth thru corruption.

Sadr has been very hostile to Iran in the past, in fact that was his calling card. It's disturbing the degree to which he is now evidently cooperating with Iran.

It's a complicated picture. Maybe Sadr will reconcile w/ other Shitte without massive bloodshed. But I think Iraq is at crossroads.

[texaspackerbacker]

Good Grief, Harlan, where do you get such all out CRAP?

Al Maliki returned from Basra victorious over the renegade militias. The Iraqi troops did so easily without the small remnant--of police, not military--who skipped out on the fight. Because they were out-gunned? That's just laughable! The Iraqi military alone had far superior numbers and even farther superior firepower to the enemy, not to mention having American airpower and British artillery backing them up.

Al Sadr stood down his militia--if you want to talk about superior firepower, there it is--stacked against the Mahdis. Then, al Sadr gives a very large hint--stating that if the Shi'ite leadership i.e. the Grand Ayatollah--wants his militia disbanded, he would comply. That brings us to the present.

Reading your previous post, it sounded like maybe you heard some new news that I hadn't heard. Barring something like that, all we have are the FACTS at hand based on the events of the past couple of weeks--which are COMPLETELY CONTRARY to what you posted.

Iraqi troops control the oil facilities. Al Sadr was hostile to Iraq? He practically commuted back and forth from there; He got his weapons from them. I have no idea whether al Sadr will "reconcile" with other militias; Who says they even have any differences? Who cares--they all are mostly irrelevant?

[Harlan Huckleby]

Tex,

You have some interest and knowlege about Iraq, but I have much more.

Almost every word you said was wrong. Since you won't accept that I know the basic facts well, I would have to dig around the internet for references to cite for you. Even then, you tend to dismiss articles written by the NY Times or Washington Post. (BTW these are the ONLY western papers with staffs in Iraq. )

I love to hear myself talk, I'd take the time to explain myself, but I don't want to do it as an argument.

[Harlan Huckleby]

looks like positive developments, but fuzzy:
Iraqi Army Seizes Basra From Militia as Cleric Threatens New Uprising

not so positive:
Cleric Sadr Threatens "Open War" on Iraq Government