Neither "Success Rate" or "Expected Points Added" of run vs. pass under this analysis considers the score, time remaining, defensive/special teams impacts, or many other variables. This failure also undermines/nullifies the conclusion that coaches are only thinking one play at a time and not at the "game level."Implications
Coaches appear to be overly focused on play-level success (represented by SR) and not focused enough on drive-level (represented by EPA) and game-level success (represented by WPA). They’ll spend late nights in the film room dissecting every possible match-up for the slightest advantage on a single play, but they’ll ignore the numbers that suggest they pass more or go for it on 4th down. They’re looking down at the sport from a 10-foot ladder when they should also be looking at it from the 10,000-foot level.
It's clear that NFL coaches, contrary to the conclusion he draws, are very willing to risk "failing" on specific plays to set up greater successes later, protect a deficiency in anther area, and/or put themselves in position to win the game by expiring the time clock.
The suggested conclusion that teams should pass every time and go for it on 4th down until this over-simplified analytical perspective reaches equilibrium does not encompass other real-world complexities into its model.