Quote Originally Posted by vince View Post
Taking this definition and your identification of McCarthy with these negative traits, I've researched the reality of the situation, and it turns out that there are extensive, incontrovertable facts about the reality of McCarthy's level of effectiveness in closing games iwth the lead...
You see, that's where I disagree with you. The stats that you provide prove nothing relative to the "reality of McCarthy's level of effectiveness." I see McCarthy's name no where in the stat tables you provide. The tables compare team winning percentages; they say nothing about how or why those percentages are as they are. Stats do not conclude. YOU conclude based on the assumption YOU bring to the table, namely that Head Coaching strategy and game management is directly and solely responsible for the team winning percentages listed.

In fact, any number of factors could be responsible for the stats. Head Coaching strategy and game management is only one factor. Another might be a great offense and superior excellence in the QB position. Another might be overall excellence of players at all positions. Another might be consistently effective performance by the defense. In fact, one could just as easily conclude from the data that Dom Capers is as much responsible for the Packers' won/loss percentage in the stats as McCarthy.

Moreover, it is possible the Packers may have scored high in these won/loss results despite iffy Head Coaching offensive strategy and game management in the second half and 4th quarter. You cannot prove otherwise by reference alone to the statistics you provide.

Quote Originally Posted by vince View Post
The fact that a coach has very limited control of when and where a failure will occur (he can draw on experience to estimate its chances of happening and to what extent) is EXACTLY the reason they do control what they can - and that is the IMPACT of failure if/when it occurs - late in games with the lead are the instances where doing so is most successful - and failing to do so carries the greatest risk. By minimizing the potential impacts of failure through risk averse decisions, coaches can help position their team to close the game successfully, not in spite of the uncrontrollable factors but by minimizing their negative impacts to the goal of winning the game.
The truth is that a coach is not simply a risk manager. Yes, each and every play in a football game carries "x" amount of risk of "bad things" happening (lost yards, fumbles, penalties, interceptions, etc.) which the coach must assess and consider based on his knowledge and experience. But each and every play also carries "y" amount of reward potential for "good things" happening (yards gained, field position, scoring position, 1st down gained, time off the clock, etc.) which the coach must assess and weigh against the risk.

How the coach chooses to weigh risk against reward potential tells us whether he is "conservative" or "aggressive," "old school" or "new school" or however we want to describe it. Stubby has proved time and time again that he is, generally speaking, old school conservative.