4th Quarter Comeback Analysis

[th87]

So after falling into the rabbit hole in the "Is Rodgers getting a free pass" thread, I've put together an analysis of 4th quarter comebacks by situation to get a more accurate reading of just how "clutch" offenses (and their starting QBs) are. To do so, I've gone back and taken a look at team play-by-plays in close games. I'll periodically (maybe) post this analysis for as many QBs as I possibly can without going insane.

Methodology:

I'm defining a 4th quarter comeback (4QC) opportunity by situations in which a team is down by one possession, and said team has the opportunity to tie or take the lead.

First I am aggregating the total number of such 4QC opportunities.

Next, I am breaking down each 4QC opportunities by the following situations and applying a weighted number to them. The situations are:

1. Wins where an opponent drive was impossible after go-ahead score (e.g. an OT win, or a score with less than 1:00 remaining). The weighted value = 3.

2. Wins where only one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score, where more than 1:00 remained. The weighted value = 2.

3. Wins where more than one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score. The weighted value = 1.

4. Losses where lead or tie was achieved, but the defense gave up the lead/tie with no chance to come back. The weighted value = 0.

5. Losses where a lead was taken, but the lead was subsequently given up by the defense, but there was still enough time to win (> 1:00). The weighted value = -1.

6. Losses where a tie was achieved, and there were chances to take the lead, but the offense failed to do so. The weighted value = -2.

7. Losses where the team was unsuccessful in achieving the tie or go-ahead score. The weighted value is = -3.

So here's the formula for 4th quarter comeback prowess:

4QC Rating = (3*(Wins where an opponent drive was impossible after go-ahead score) + 2*(Wins where only one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score) + 1*(Wins where more than one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score) + 0*(Losses where lead or tie was achieved, but the defense gave up the lead/tie with no chance to come back) + -1*(Losses where a lead was taken, but the lead was subsequently given up by the defense, but there was still enough time to win) + -2*(Losses where a tie was achieved, and there were chances to take the lead, but the offense failed to do so) + -3*(Losses where the team was unsuccessful in achieving the tie or go-ahead score)) / (Total number of 4th quarter comeback opportunities)

That is, 4QC rating is equal to the weighted sum of all 4th quarter comeback attempt outcomes, divided by the total number of 4th quarter comeback opportunities.

[th87]

Here is the raw data for Rodgers since he became a starter:

2008:

@TB: Down 23-21 with 2:28, Rodgers (with dislocated shoulder) throws interception with 2:19 remaining. TB scores TD on the subsequent play to put the game out of reach.
ATL: Down 20-17, Rodgers throws interception with 4:42 remaining. ATL scores TD to put the game out of reach.
@TEN: Down 16-13, Packers drive and kick FG with 5:35 remaining. Subsequent Titans and Packers drives stall, followed by the Titans missing the game winner. Titans get the ball in OT and win.
@MIN: Down 28-27 with 2:30 remaining, Packers drive down to FG range and miss 52 yard FG.
CAR: Tied at 28, Packers drive and kick a FG with 2:00 remaining. Panthers score TD 2 plays later with 1:33. Rodgers throws interception with 1:19 remaining.
HOU: Down 21-14 with 10:01, Packers drive and Rodgers ties the game on a TD pass. Subsequent Texans and Packers drives stall, and on the next drive, Texans kick game-winning FG.
@JAX: Down 14-13 with 10:39, Packers drive to kick a FG with 5:40 remaining. Jaguars score TD on subsequent drive with 1:56. Rodgers throws interception with 0:46 remaining.
@CHI: Bears tie game 17-17 with 3:16 remaining. Packers drive to Bears 20 on subsequent drive, and game winner is blocked with 0:25 remaining. Bears get the ball in OT and win.

2009:

CHI: Bears hit FG to take 15-13 lead with 2:38 remaining. Rodgers hits Jennings for go-ahead TD with 1:18 remaining (2-point conversion good). Defense intercepts Cutler on subsequent drive.
CIN: Bengals take a 31-21 lead with 2:00 remaining. Packers drive for FG with 0:49 remaining, and win onside kick. Rodgers hits Driver at Bengals 10 with 0:16 remaining, but Packers are unable to stop the clock in time (Spitz false started).
MIN: Vikings take 31-20 lead with 13:39 remaining. Packers drive for TD on subsequent drive, but fail on 2-point conversion. 31-26. Packers force a punt, and then drive to Vikings 33, where Crosby misses the FG with 5:43 remaining. Vikings score TD on subsequent drive, putting the game out of reach.
@TB: Bucs take 31-28 lead with 4:20 remaining. Subsequent Packers and Bucs drives stall. On the next Packers drive, on 4th and 12 from their own 11, with 0:52 remaining, Rodgers throws a pick 6, which effectively ends the game.
@CHI: With a 14-13 lead going into the 4th quarter, Cutler throws an interception, returned to the Bears 11. Packers score a TD and 2-point conversion with 12:42 remaining, and make 3 defensive stops to end the game.
@PIT: Packers take a 36-30 lead with 2:12 remaining. Steelers subsequently march down the field, and score the winning TD on the last play of the game.

Playoffs:
@AZ: Rodgers throws TD to tie game with 2:00 remaining. Cards drive to GB 16 and miss FG with 0:14 left. Packers receive in OT, and Cards score on a Rodgers fumble return.

2010:

@CHI: Packers take 17-14 lead with 6:59 remaining. Bears score FG on subsequent drive to tie, and on the Packers next drive, Jones fumbles. Bears drive and kick game-winning FG.
@WAS: Redskins tie game at 13-13 with 1:11 remaining. Packers drive to WAS 35, where Crosby misses FG. In OT, Packers and Redskins drives stall. On subsequent Packers drive, Rodgers throws INT at GB 39. Redskins drive and kick winning FG.
MIA: Packers down 20-13 with 5:29 remaining. Packers tie on a Rodgers sneak with 0:16 remaining. In OT, Dolphins and Packers drives stall. Dolphins subsequently drive to kick winning FG.
@ATL: Packers down 17-10 with 5:59 remaining. Packers drive 90 yards to score on Rodgers TD pass with 1:06 remaining. Falcons drive and kick winning FG with 0:13 remaining.
CHI: Tied 3-3, Rodgers throws TD pass with 12:46 remaining. Packers defense holds on three subsequent drives to seal the victory.

2011:

@NYG: Giants tie game at 35-35 with 1:02 remaining. Packers subsequently drive and kick game winning FG with 0:03 remaining.

2012:

SF: Packers score on Rodgers TD pass to make it 30-22 with 6:09 remaining. Packers defense gets a stop with 3:45 remaining. Packers subsequent drive stalls on down with 0:54 remaining, on the 49ers 45.
@SEA: Packers score with 8:53 remaining to take 12-7 lead. Seahawks subsequently turn the ball over on downs with 2:00 remaining. Packers subsequently go three and out (sounds familiar), and then Fail Mary occurs.
NO: Packers go ahead 28-27 on Rodgers TD pass with 7:05 remaining. Saints drive and miss a FG with 2:54 remaining. Packers subsequently convert a first down to end the game.
@IND: Colts take a 22-21 lead with 8:08 left. Subsequent Packers and Colts drives stall. On the following drive, Packers score TD and miss 2-point conversion with 4:34 remaining. Colts subsequently drive and score TD and 2-point conversion to make it 30-27 with 0:39 remaining. Packers drive to Colts 33 and miss tying FG with 0:08 left.
@MIN: Down 27-24, Packers kick FG with 12:25 remaining. Vikings subsequently drive and score a TD with 8:03 left. Packers subsequently drive and score a TD with 2:57 remaining. Vikings subsequently drive and kick game winner with 0:03 left.
@DET: Lions take 20-14 lead with 4:25 remaining. Packers drive and Rodgers throws go-ahead TD with 2:02 remaining. Defense subsequently forces a turnover on downs, and Packers add another FG.
DET: Tied 17-17 going into the 4th. Packers drive and score go-ahead TD with 10:49 remaining. Packers stop subsequent Lions drive, and themselves drive for another FG. Packers make two more stops to end the game.

2013:

@SF: 49ers take a 24-21 lead with 14:21 left. Next Packers and 49ers drives stall. On subsequent drive, Packers drive quickly to score a TD with 8:32 left. 49ers then score on subsequent drive with 5:51 remaining. Packers next drive stalls, and 49ers grind out a long drive capped off by a FG with 0:30 remaining. Subsequent Packers drive runs out of time.
@CIN: After losing a 30-21 lead, Bengals score on a fumble return to take a 34-30 lead. Packers subsequently drive to Bengals 20, where they turn it over on downs, and Bengals run out the clock.
@BAL: Ravens score to cut Packers lead to 2 (19-17) with 2:07 remaining. Packers offense then picks up first downs and runs out the clock.
@CHI: Down 28-27, Rodgers throws long TD pass to take 33-28 lead with 0:46 remaining. Defense holds to close out the game.

Playoffs:
SF: Packers kick FG to tie, 20-20, with 5:09 remaining. 49ers subsequently drive to kick game winning FG at the end of regulation.

2014:

@MIA: Down 24-20, the Packers receive the ball with 2:04 remaining. Packers subsequently drive and score game winning TD pass with 0:06 left.
NE: Packers score FG with 8:45 remaining to extend lead to 26-21. Packers are then able to run out the clock with good defense and picking up first downs.
@BUF: Packers receive the ball with 2:07 remaining, down 19-13. Rodgers then suffers a sack/fumble, resulting in safety, effectively ending the game.

Playoffs:
DAL: Down 21-20, Rodgers throws TD strike with 9:10 remaining. The following drive results in the Bryant non-catch by rule, and the Packers are able to drive to run out the clock.
@SEA: Seattle scores TD and 2-point conversion to go ahead 22-19 with 1:33 remaining. Packers then drive to Seahawks 30 to kick tying FG with 0:19 left. We know what happens next.

[th87]

So analyzing the numbers, here's what we have for Rodgers:

Total 4th quarter comeback opportunities:

2008: 8
2009: 6
2010: 5
2011: 1
2012: 7
2013: 4
2014: 4
Total: 35

1. Wins where an opponent drive was impossible after go-ahead score (e.g. an OT win, or a score with less than 1:00 remaining) (Weighted value = 3):

2008: 0/8
2009: 0/6
2010: 0/5
2011: 1/1
2012: 0/7
2013: 1/4
2014: 1/4
Total: 3/35

2. Wins where only one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score, where more than 1:00 remained (Weighted value = 2):

2008: 0/8
2009: 1/6
2010: 0/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 2/7
2013: 0/4
2014: 1/4
Total: 4/35

3. Wins where more than one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score (Weighted value = 1):

2008: 0/8
2009: 1/6
2010: 1/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 1/7
2013: 0/4
2014: 0/4
Total: 3/35

4. Losses where lead or tie was achieved, but the defense gave up the lead/tie with no chance to come back (Weighted value = 0):

2008: 0/8
2009: 1/6
2010: 2/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 2/7
2013: 1/4
2014: 1/4
Total: 7/35

5. Losses where a lead was taken, but the lead was subsequently given up by the defense, but there was still enough time to win (> 1:00) (Weighted value = -1):

2008: 2/8
2009: 0/6
2010: 0/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 1/7
2013: 1/4
2014: 0/4
Total: 4/35

6. Losses where a tie was achieved, and there were chances to take the lead, but the offense failed to do so (Weighted value = -2):

2008: 2/8
2009: 1/6
2010: 2/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 0/7
2013: 0/4
2014: 0/4
Total: 5/35

7. Losses where the team was unsuccessful in achieving the tie or go-ahead score (Weighted value = -3):

2008: 4/8
2009: 2/6
2010: 0/5
2011: 0/1
2012: 1/7
2013: 1/4
2014: 1/4
Total: 9/35

So applying our formula, here's what we get:

(3(3) +2(4) + 1(3) + 0(7) + -1(4) + -2(5) + -3(9))/35

= -0.6 = Rodgers' 4QC value

[th87]

Here's the raw data for Brady:

2001:

@NYJ: Patriots get ball down 16-14 with 12:16. Score go-ahead FG with 7:36. Patriots snag interception with 2:07 to go (Terrell Buckley!), and are able to run out the clock. 17-16.
@BUF: Patriots get ball down 9-6 with 6:20. Score tying FG with 2:50. Next Bills and Patriots drives stall, and Bills drive stalls in overtime. Patriots drive and kick GW FG. 12-9.

Playoffs:

OAK: Patriots get ball down 13-10 with 2:06. Patriots drive, Tuck Rule occurs, and Patriots kick tying FG with 0:32. In overtime, Patriots drive to kick GW FG.
STL: Tied at 17 with 1:21, Patriots drive and kick GW FG with 0:07.

2002:

KC: Tied at 38 in OT, Patriots drive and kick GW FG.
@SD: Down 21-14 with 1:51, Patriots lose fumble late, and Chargers run out the clock.
DEN: Down 24-16 with 4:21, Patriots forced to punt, and Broncos run out the clock.
@CHI: Down 30-25 with 1:50 (after being down 27-6), Patriots score go ahead TD and 2PC with 0:28.
MIA: Down 24-21 with 2:11, Patriots score tying FG with 1:14. Defense makes stop to force OT. Patriots drive in OT to kick GW FG.

2003:

@WAS: Down 20-17 with 1:39, Patriots go 4 and out.
TEN: Down 27-24 with 4:29, Patriots score go-ahead TD. A pick 6 and another defensive stop secure the victory.
MIA: Tied at 13 in OT, Brady throws an 82 yard TD for the win.
@DEN: Down 26-23 with 2:15, Patriots score TD with 0:36.
@HOU: Down 20-13 with 3:04, Patriots score tying TD with 0:40. In OT, after a few defensive stops, Patriots drive to score GW FG.
@IND: Tied at 31 with 10:10, Patriots drive and score TD with 8:41. Patriots hold Colts to FG and make 2 defensive stops to win.

Playoffs:

TEN: Tied at 14 with 6:40, Patriots drive and kick FG with 4:11. Patriots defense gets defensive stop and run out the clock.
CAR: Down 22-21 with 6:47, Patriots score TD and 2PC with 2:55. Panthers drive and score tying TD. Patriots drive and score FG with 0:09.

2004:

@BUF: Tied at 17 entering 4Q, Patriots drive and score TD with 11:24. Patriots get 3 defensive stops to secure win.
@MIA: Down 29-28 with 1:23, Brady throws interception to end game.

2005:

@PIT: Tied at 20 with 1:14, Patriots drive to kick GW FG with 0:05.
@ATL: Tied at 28 with 3:52, Patriots drive to kick GW FG with 0:20.
@DEN: Down 28-20 with 5:02, Patriots fail to score again, and Broncos run out the clock.
BUF: Down 16-14 with 6:14, the Patriots score TD (on a short field because of a fumble) with 5:38. Patriots get a defensive stop and run out the clock.
@MIA: Down 16-15 with 2:53, Patriots drive and score TD with 2:19. Patriots make defensive stop and run out the clock.

2006:

BUF: Down 17-14 entering 4Q, Patriots drive and kick a FG with 9:37. Defense gets safety on ensuing drive, and another stop, and offense is able to run out the clock.
IND: Down 27-20 with 1:55, Brady throws interception and Colts run out the clock.
NYJ: Down 17-14 with 1:08, Brady fumbles on the last play of regulation.
CHI: Tied at 10 with 14:46, Patriots drive and score TD with 8:25. Patriots get two defensive stops (one allowing FG) to preserve victory.
DET: Down 21-13 with 12:57, Patriots drive and get tying score with 8:39. After forcing 2 turnovers, the last with 5:57, the Patriots drive to score another TD with 2:38. Patriots get another defensive stop and run out the clock.

Playoffs:

SD: Down 21-13 with 8:28, Patriots drive and luck out on an interception and subsequent fumble, and are able to score TD and 2PC to tie. Patriots get another stop, drive, and kick a FG with 1:14. Chargers drive and miss FG.
IND: Tied at 28 with 10:26, Patriots drive and kick FG with 7:45. Colts tie with 5:35. Patriots kick FG to lead with 3:53. Next 2 drives stall, and on third, Colts score TD with 1:02, and Brady is intercepted on following drive to end game.

2007:

@IND: Down 20-17 with 3:58 (after being down 20-10), Patriots score TD with 3:21. Patriots force fumble and run out clock.
PHI: Down 28-24 with 12:02, Patriots drive and score TD with 7:24. Patriots get defensive stop and are able to basically run out the clock.
@BAL: Down 24-20 with 3:30, Patriots drive and score TD with 0:55. Patriots get a defensive stop to win.
@NYG: Down 28-23 with 11:29, Patriots score TD and 2PC with 11:15. Patriots get another stop, score another TD, and put the game out of reach.

Playoffs:

NYG: Down 10-7 with 7:54, Patriots drive and score TD with 2:45. Patriots subsequently give up helmet catch and TD with 0:39.

2008:

None (injured)

2009:

BUF: Down 24-13 with 5:38 remaining, Patriots score a TD with 2:10 remaining (conversion fails). 24-19. Buffalo fumbles ensuing kickoff at own 31, and Brady throws a TD with 0:55 left (conversion fails). 25-24.
@NYJ: Down 16-9 in the 4th, the Patriots are unable to score, despite multiple drives.
@DEN: Tied 17-17, 4 consecutive drives by the Patriots and Broncos stall, and in OT, Denver gets the ball and scores.
@MIA: Dolphins kick go-ahead FG with 1:07 remaining to take 22-21 lead. Brady is intercepted with 0:42 remaining.
@HOU: Tied at 27, Brady throws an interception and gets knocked out of the game. Texans score go ahead TD with 2:00 left.

2010:

@NYJ: Down 21-14 in the 4th, Brady throws an interception, followed by a Patriots stop, then a failed Patriots drive, then a Jets TD with 6:16 left, and another failed Patriots drive to end the game.
BAL: Down 20-17, Patriots kick a tying FG with 1:54 to go. Patriots get a stop with 0:59 left, but Brady throws an interception at the end of regulation. In OT, the Ravens get the ball, but are stopped. There are 4 more stops, and the Patriots finally get the winning FG on the following drive.
GB: Down 27-24 with 9:38 remaining, Brady throws a TD with 7:19 to go. Packers are stopped twice more to preserve the lead.

2011:

@BUF: Down 31-24 because of a Brady pick-6 with 10:32 to go, the Patriots drive to tie the game with 3:33 remaining. Bills drive and kick winning FG with 0:03 left.
DAL: Down 16-13 with 2:31 to go, the Patriots drive, capped off by a Brady TD pass with 0:27 remaining.
NYG: Down 17-13 with 3:07 remaining, the Patriots drive and throw a TD with 1:40 to go. Giants then come back and score a TD with 0:19 left.

Playoffs:
BAL: Down 20-16, the Patriots score a TD with 11:33 to go. The Patriots make 3 stops (lucky ones with Lee Evans and the Cundiff miss).
NYG: Giants score to grab a 21-17 lead with 0:57 remaining. The Patriots run out of time.

2012:

AZ: Up 20-18, Cardinals fumble at own 30 with 1:10 to go. Patriots miss FG with time running out.
@SEA: Down 24-23 with 1:14 to go, the Patriots turn it over on downs.
NYJ: Down 26-23 with 1:32 to go, the Patriots tie with 0:05 to go, kick another FG on the first possession in OT, and stop the Jets.
SF: Patriots manage to tie at 31, with 6:45 to go. 49ers score TD on next drive, Patriots punt, 49ers punt, Patriots punt, 49ers kick a FG, Patriots kick a FG, and time runs out.

Playoffs:

BAL: Ravens take a 20-13 lead at the beginning of the 4th. Patriots are forced to punt on the following drive, and the Ravens score another TD in response. The Patriots next 3 drives are unsuccessful.

2013:

@BUF: Down 21-20 with 4:31 to go, the Patriots drive to kick the winning FG with 0:09 remaining.
@CIN: Down 13-6 with 3:26 remaining, the Patriots fail to score on two drives.
@NO: Down 27-23 with 1:13 to go, Brady throws a TD with 0:10 to go.
@NYJ: Down 27-24 with 2:10 to go, the Patriots kick a FG with 0:19 remaining to force OT. Patriots forced to punt in OT, and the Jets drive and kick the game winner.
@CAR: Down 17-10, the Patriots tie with 12:37, and take the lead with 6:36. Carolina then scores TD with 1:09 left, and Brady throws interception with 0:03 to go.
DEN: Down 24-21, the Patriots score a TD with 13:21 to go, adding a FG with 7:41 to go. Broncos tie with 3:10 to go. The following 5 Patriots and Broncos drives stall (3 in OT), and then Patriots score winning FG.
@HOU: Down 31-28, Patriots tie with 7:21 left, get a stop, and kick another FG with 3:15 to go. Patriots get another stop to end the game.
CLE: After scoring a TD to cut lead to 26-21, Patriots win onside kick with 1:04 remaining, and score a TD with 0:35 to go.
@MIA: Down 17-13, Patriots score TD with 4:14 to go. Dolphins score TD with 1:21. Brady throws interception at Dolphins 14 with 0:07 left.

2014:

@MIA: Down 23-20 in the 4th quarter, two Patriot drives stall, allowing the Dolphins to score again, putting the game out of reach.
@GB: Down 26-21, the Patriots are stopped.
@SD: Down 14-13, the Patriots kick a FG with 10:34 left. After a defensive stop, the Patriots add a TD with 8:53 to go. Patriots get two more stops to preserve the win.
@NYJ: Down 13-10, the Patriots score a TD with 13:56 to go. Jets kick a FG to cut it to 17-16. Brady throws an INT, and the Patriots block the ensuing FG. Patriots run out the clock.

Playoffs:
BAL: Down 31-28 with 10:10 to go, the Patriots score a TD with 5:21 left. Patriots get a stop and another on a Hail Mary.
SEA: Down 24-14 with 12:10 remaining, the Patriots score a TD with 8:00 to go, get a stop with 6:52 left, and score another TD with 2:06 to go. Patriots defense gets one last stop.

[th87]

Brady's numbers:

Total 4th quarter comeback opportunities:

2001: 4
2002: 5
2003: 8
2004: 2
2005: 5
2006: 7
2007: 5
2008: 0
2009: 5
2010: 3
2011: 4
2012: 5
2013: 9
2014: 6
Total: 68

1. Wins where an opponent drive was impossible after go-ahead score (e.g. an OT win, or a score with less than 1:00 remaining) (Weighted value = 3):

2001: 3
2002: 3
2003: 4
2004: 0
2005: 2
2006: 0
2007: 1
2008: 0
2009: 1
2010: 1
2011: 1
2012: 0
2013: 4
2014: 0
Total: 20/68

2. Wins where only one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score, where more than 1:00 remained (Weighted value = 2):

2001: 1
2002: 0
2003: 1
2004: 0
2005: 2
2006: 2
2007: 3
2008: 0
2009: 0
2010: 0
2011: 0
2012: 1
2013: 1
2014: 1
Total: 12/68

3. Wins where more than one defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score (Weighted value = 1):

2001: 0
2002: 0
2003: 2
2004: 1
2005: 0
2006: 2
2007: 0
2008: 0
2009: 0
2010: 1
2011: 1
2012: 0
2013: 0
2014: 3
Total: 10/68

4. Losses where lead or tie was achieved, but the defense gave up the lead/tie with no chance to come back (Weighted value = 0):

2001: 0
2002: 0
2003: 0
2004: 0
2005: 0
2006: 0
2007: 1
2008: 0
2009: 0
2010: 0
2011: 2
2012: 0
2013: 0
2014: 0
Total: 3/68

5. Losses where a lead was taken, but the lead was subsequently given up by the defense, but there was still enough time to win (> 1:00) (Weighted value = -1):

2001: 0
2002: 0
2003: 0
2004: 0
2005: 0
2006: 1
2007: 0
2008: 0
2009: 0
2010: 0
2011: 0
2012: 0
2013: 2
2014: 0
Total: 3/68

6. Losses where a tie was achieved, and there were chances to take the lead, but the offense failed to do so (Weighted value = -2):

2001: 0
2002: 0
2003: 0
2004: 0
2005: 0
2006: 0
2007: 0
2008: 0
2009: 2
2010: 0
2011: 0
2012: 1
2013: 1
2014: 0
Total: 4/68

7. Losses where the team was unsuccessful in achieving the tie or go-ahead score (Weighted value = -3):

2001: 0
2002: 2
2003: 1
2004: 1
2005: 1
2006: 2
2007: 0
2008: 0
2009: 2
2010: 1
2011: 0
2012: 3
2013: 1
2014: 2
Total: 16/68

So applying our formula, here's what we get:

(3(20) +2(12) + 1(10) + 0(3) + -1(3) + -2(4) + -3(16))/68

= 0.51 = Brady's 4QC value

[th87]

Thoughts so far?

[mraynrand]

Their values are different, but is the difference large or small? I'll wait for the executive summary, crafted by objective and uninterested politicians.

[vince]

Wow that's a lot of work th. What's your thesis for this project?

You can make the argument that the one chink in Rodgers' armor is 4th quarter comebacks. I think it's a little overblown at this point. That first year puts him in a pretty big whole with a pretty small sample size to overcome. You can see how heavily weighted thse opportunities are to the beginning of his career. He's so good at everything and he's come up big in the fourth quarter of a lot of big games particularly in and since 2010.

Five years from now it might have more significance but it may also be a total non-issue by then too. He's pretty damn good - in every quarter.

Brady may go down as the best ever but I'd take Rodgers in any situation at any time of any game and be very happy about it.

[vince]

I'm not sure what to make of the formula th. It might be better to say that Rodgers was successful in 17 of the 35 instances and unsuccessful in 18. So he's 17-18 or .485 (that don't make the playoffs). Only 6 of Rodgers' 17 successes and 13 of Rodgers' 18 failures came in his first three years. So he's had 11 successes and 5 failures since. That's .687 since 2010. That's selective obviously but it's where one trend breaks into the opposite direction. And when you look at 2010 the trend changed direction in the middle of the year. All the successes occurred at the end of that year and all the failures happened in the beginning of the year.

So it's only 4 of Rodgers' successes happened before the midway point of 2010 and 16 of his 18 failures. He's 13 and 2 in 4th quarter comebacks since the halfway point of 2010. .866. That's pretty damn good.

Brady is 45-23 (.661) for his career. That could be the best ever overall.

[vince]

I think my math is off there somewhere but the same conclusion still holds. Rodgers still has some work to do to keep up with or overcome Brady for his career - but he's got a chance to do it if he plays at the high level he's been , particularly since 2010, regardless of quarter.

[vince]

Rodgers was 3 and 13 (.200) up to the midpoint of 2010 and is 14 - 5 (.700) since.

[th87]

Wow that's a lot of work th. What's your thesis for this project?

You can make the argument that the one chink in Rodgers' armor is 4th quarter comebacks. I think it's a little overblown at this point. That first year puts him in a pretty big whole with a pretty small sample size to overcome. You can see how heavily weighted thse opportunities are to the beginning of his career. He's so good at everything and he's come up big in the fourth quarter of a lot of big games particularly in and since 2010.

Five years from now it might have more significance but it may also be a total non-issue by then too. He's pretty damn good - in every quarter.

Brady may go down as the best ever but I'd take Rodgers in any situation at any time of any game and be very happy about it.


I'm not sure what to make of the formula th. It might be better to say that Rodgers was successful in 17 of the 35 instances and unsuccessful in 18. So he's 17-18 or .485 (that don't make the playoffs). Only 6 of Rodgers' 17 successes and 13 of Rodgers' 18 failures came in his first three years. So he's had 11 successes and 5 failures since. That's .687 since 2010. That's selective obviously but it's where one trend breaks into the opposite direction. And when you look at 2010 the trend changed direction in the middle of the year. All the successes occurred at the end of that year and all the failures happened in the beginning of the year.

So it's only 4 of Rodgers' successes happened before the midway point of 2010 and 16 of his 18 failures. He's 13 and 2 in 4th quarter comebacks since the halfway point of 2010. .866. That's pretty damn good.

Brady is 45-23 (.661) for his career. That could be the best ever overall.

Thanks for the feedback!

I'd say the thesis is to take a closer look at 4th quarter comeback statistics and see if our prevailing perceptions make sense. The talking heads say that Rodgers can't get it done, but you're right - in the last few years, he has been rather good in this regard (and his defense has been delivering a lot more), but one oddity is that he still has no wins in overtime.

I wanted to see if a metric works that takes into account the type of comeback and failure. QBs get too much credit for "comebacks" that take place early in the 4th, that require defensive stops to maintain. And they receive too much blame when the defense ends up giving up a lead. So that's why I award the most points to a "last score" situation, where there is no time left, or it happens as the winning score in overtime. Next one down the tier would be a go-ahead score that needs one more defensive stop to maintain, and so on. QBs get no blame if they get the go-ahead or tying score, but the defense subsequently gives up a score with too little time left.

The way you're scoring it is fine, but it is shifting all credit to the QB for a defense doing its job, and then giving a QB credit for a "win" when the team lost, and thus maybe ought to be considered a "no decision". The weighting takes care of that.

[th87]

Rodgers was 3 and 13 (.200) up to the midpoint of 2010 and is 14 - 5 (.700) since.

Since the @ATL game in 2010, Rodgers 4QCR is 0.33. This is much closer to Brady's stellar numbers.

[vince]

OK I see the weighing of scenarios, but If you're analyzing "QB x' 4th Quarter Comebacks" then I'm not sure how he - as the individual being attributed varying degrees of success or failure - shouldn't get a positive score for scenario #4. The individual being measured did nothing different from scenario #2 so why would he be attributed different weights in the metric for instances where he performed equally successfully in the same circumstance?

Building his own team's defensive performance into the model that purports to evaluate the performance of a QB delivers misleading results I'd say.

[pbmax]

By including the clock in the evaluation, you make a whole host of factors important that the QB has minimal control over. Opponents TOs, strength of run game, play calls (in breaking or out breaking routes to preserve time on drive?) and D strategy (bleed yards or force 3 and out?), confusion on the sideline (a Packer specialty) a factor of the QB evaluation.

You also penalize big plays, which is the bread and butter of the Packer offense. Your evaluation rewards a specific, short passing QB and offense or a good running game.

So its far from clear that a QB who scores well with your criteria, is a good choice for a team's QB.

I do, however, still think this is an area that McCarthy needs to rethink his approach. Mostly about time and the running game.

[th87]

OK I see the weighing of scenarios, but If you're analyzing "QB x' 4th Quarter Comebacks" then I'm not sure how he - as the individual being attributed varying degrees of success or failure - shouldn't get a positive score for scenario #4. The individual being measured did nothing different from scenario #2 so why would he be attributed different weights in the metric for instances where he performed equally successfully in the same circumstance?

Building his own team's defensive performance into the model that purports to evaluate the performance of a QB delivers misleading results I'd say.

This is a good point. I'll definitely revisit this.

[th87]

By including the clock in the evaluation, you make a whole host of factors important that the QB has minimal control over. Opponents TOs, strength of run game, play calls (in breaking or out breaking routes to preserve time on drive?) and D strategy (bleed yards or force 3 and out?), confusion on the sideline (a Packer specialty) a factor of the QB evaluation.

You also penalize big plays, which is the bread and butter of the Packer offense. Your evaluation rewards a specific, short passing QB and offense or a good running game.

So its far from clear that a QB who scores well with your criteria, is a good choice for a team's QB.

I do, however, still think this is an area that McCarthy needs to rethink his approach. Mostly about time and the running game.

Obviously it won't be perfect, but I think the ultimate goal of a late 4th quarter comeback is to go ahead AND leave as little time on the clock as possible. If a team is successful in doing so, despite opponents TOs, and D strategies, then they should be rewarded accordingly. So too should be the offense that gets the winning score in OT.

The issue of a big play quick score would then still rely on a defensive stop to complete, and so I don't consider this the "holy grail" of clutch comebacks. This situation would still be scored positively, and I don't know that it happens often enough for the Packers relative to the Patriots that it would make a huge difference in numbers.

Adjustment suggestions are welcome though.

[pbmax]

Obviously it won't be perfect, but I think the ultimate goal of a late 4th quarter comeback is to go ahead AND leave as little time on the clock as possible. If a team is successful in doing so, despite opponents TOs, and D strategies, then they should be rewarded accordingly. So too should be the offense that gets the winning score in OT.

The issue of a big play quick score would then still rely on a defensive stop to complete, and so I don't consider this the "holy grail" of clutch comebacks. This situation would still be scored positively, and I don't know that it happens often enough for the Packers relative to the Patriots that it would make a huge difference in numbers.

Adjustment suggestions are welcome though.

I like the different weights, with vince making a good point about an adjustment.

But the metric still is more about the team than the QB.

But I do think it hits on the issue that plagues M3's approach. I do not think this is a coincidence that Rodgers suffers along with the rest of the team in this area. He contributes (short passing is not top strength) but its not the only thing going on.

The problem with big plays to tie or win in this scenario is that they suffer in the comparison to longer, lengthier drives. If you score from 40 yards out, you will be leaving more time on the clock.

[vince]

I like the different weights, with vince making a good point about an adjustment.

But the metric still is more about the team than the QB.

But I do think it hits on the issue that plagues M3's approach. I do not think this is a coincidence that Rodgers suffers along with the rest of the team in this area. He contributes (short passing is not top strength) but its not the only thing going on.

The problem with big plays to tie or win in this scenario is that they suffer in the comparison to longer, lengthier drives. If you score from 40 yards out, you will be leaving more time on the clock.
Rodgers/Rest of Team is likely among the best in the league in this area since midpoint 2010 - at least on par with Brady/Pats.

His career performance is heavily impacted by his first 2 1/2 years and the relatively small sample size in the 4 1/2 years since unable to overcome the relatively large sample in that time.

[pbmax]

Rodgers/Rest of Team is likely among the best in the league in this area since midpoint 2010 - at least on par with Brady/Pats.

His career performance is heavily impacted by his first 2 1/2 years and the relatively small sample size in the 4 1/2 years since unable to overcome the relatively large sample in that time.

In this discussion, it has to be remembered that these losses occurred with a team that has the second best record in the League over McCarthy's tenure. So this is an interesting gap in their resume, not a fatal flaw. The losses are small in number compared to the rest of the League overall.

But within that group of losses, I don't think this team is built for come from behind. Part of it is coaching strategy (the team's late game strategy practically invites close finishes at times) and some of it is Rodgers (relying solely on short passing). But largely its dependent on the strength of the running game. If the Packers can run on a team, they don't fall behind after getting a lead. If they can't they are vulnerable. And as good as Lacy is, the Packers are not a run the clock out team against a good run defense. They aren't hopeless, but its not the strength of the O line.

Taking the ball out of your best players hands is the biggest mistake.

[vince]

In this discussion, it has to be remembered that these losses occurred with a team that has the second best record in the League over McCarthy's tenure. So this is an interesting gap in their resume, not a fatal flaw. The losses are small in number compared to the rest of the League overall.

But within that group of losses, I don't think this team is built for come from behind. Part of it is coaching strategy (the team's late game strategy practically invites close finishes at times) and some of it is Rodgers (relying solely on short passing). But largely its dependent on the strength of the running game. If the Packers can run on a team, they don't fall behind after getting a lead. If they can't they are vulnerable. And as good as Lacy is, the Packers are not a run the clock out team against a good run defense. They aren't hopeless, but its not the strength of the O line.

Taking the ball out of your best players hands is the biggest mistake.
That makes perfect sense PB, but I'm not clear on how that relates to thes facts. This study indicates that (notwithstanding the question of weighting to value different comebacks differently) since the Miami game in 2010, Rodgers has 14 successful 4th Q comeback attempts against 5 failed 4th Q comeback attempts. That's a .737 success rate. That's at least equal to McCarthy's win/loss % in that time and with a small sample size, you can say that it's right in the ballpark. While what you're saying may be true, I don't see how you can derive that conclusion from this information.

[mraynrand]

I want Dyoop to subject this to principle component analysis.

[pbmax]

That makes perfect sense PB, but I'm not clear on how that relates to thes facts. This study indicates that (notwithstanding the question of weighting to value different comebacks differently) since the Miami game in 2010, Rodgers has 14 successful 4th Q comeback attempts against 5 failed 4th Q comeback attempts. That's a .737 success rate. That's at least equal to McCarthy's win/loss % in that time and with a small sample size, you can say that it's right in the ballpark. While what you're saying may be true, I don't see how you can derive that conclusion from this information.

14 and 5 (which almost sounds too good compared to my memory) is about what I would expect for a 19 game stretch from a team as good as the Packers. But I am still less than thrilled with the offense needing a score late in the game.

They took strides this year against good defenses (Miami, Seattle) but its not as efficient as the rest of the O.

[th87]

There may be another metric to work in - that is, "Losses where team had to settle for tying FG on last drive", and change the "Losses where lead or tie was achieved..." metric to "Losses where lead was achieved..." The assumption in this scenario is that the offense had one minute or more and were down by 3. This would highlight the game that shall not be named and the 49ers playoff loss last year, off the top of my head. I wonder if this would highlight any aggressiveness issues relative to other teams.

But that would be a lot of work. :)

[th87]

There may be another metric to work in - that is, "Losses where team had to settle for tying FG on last drive", and change the "Losses where lead or tie was achieved..." metric to "Losses where lead was achieved..." The assumption in this scenario is that the offense had one minute or more and were down by 3. This would highlight the game that shall not be named and the 49ers playoff loss last year, off the top of my head. I wonder if this would highlight any aggressiveness issues relative to other teams.

But that would be a lot of work. :)

Never mind - it looks like that happened only those two times.

[th87]

OK I see the weighing of scenarios, but If you're analyzing "QB x' 4th Quarter Comebacks" then I'm not sure how he - as the individual being attributed varying degrees of success or failure - shouldn't get a positive score for scenario #4. The individual being measured did nothing different from scenario #2 so why would he be attributed different weights in the metric for instances where he performed equally successfully in the same circumstance?

Building his own team's defensive performance into the model that purports to evaluate the performance of a QB delivers misleading results I'd say.

Okay, so adjusting the formula to weigh Scenario 4 the same as Scenario 2 (2 points):

Rodgers career 4QCR = -0.2
Rodgers since mid-2010 = 0.95

Brady 4QCR = 0.60

So it looks like Rodgers' numbers are fantastic, but the Packers have suffered this type of loss in 6 out of 19 comeback opportunity games since mid-2010. Namely:

2010 MIA
2010 @ATL
2012 @IND
2012 @MIN
2013 SF playoff
2014 Game that shall not be named

In all of those games, the defense displayed total "unclutchness". In four of them, there was nothing the offense could've done to avoid what happened (scored the necessary TDs). In two of them, the offense had to settle for FGs.

[Jimx29]

You're missing one important stat that i'm interested in.......how many hours do you sleep on average?

[th87]

You're missing one important stat that i'm interested in.......how many hours do you sleep on average?

I'm not that clutch at end-of-day situations, so not as much as I should.

[mraynrand]

Okay, so adjusting the formula to weigh Scenario 4 the same as Scenario 2 (2 points):

Rodgers career 4QCR = -0.2
Rodgers since mid-2010 = 0.95

Brady 4QCR = 0.60

Was a scale established yet? (i.e. are there NFL norms and a range) This is too much number salad to sift through. But if the scale is from -100 (Grossman, Tagge) to +100 (Elway), then Rodgers and Brady are no different; it's all a wash.

[sharpe1027]

Interesting discussion. Correct me if I am wrong, but if you score early and often in the 4th quarter, you get lower rating under this metric. In the extreme case, a QB that scores 21 points in the 4th looks worse than one that struggles the entire quarter and throws one late TD.

I have no idea if that matters in the Rodgers vs Brady comparison, but I think the whole concept of "clutch" is suspect as a QB metric. This is still one of the best breakdowns.

[vince]

Was a scale established yet? (i.e. are there NFL norms and a range) This is too much number salad to sift through. But if the scale is from -100 (Grossman, Tagge) to +100 (Elway), then Rodgers and Brady are no different; it's all a wash.
The "best" score in this model would be 3.0 - if 100% of the QB's comebacks were successful and on the last possession of the game. The "worst" score would be -3.0 - if 100% of the QB's comeback attempts were unsuccessful, meaning the team never took a 4th Q lead in any situation in which it was down by one score or less in the 4th quarter.

Sharpe's comment about the impact of the weighting is true, which is the main reason I'm a bit skeptical about it. I'd tend to agree that, to the extent there's a value to "clutchness," the later in the game the comeback occurs the more "clutch" it is, but it incorporates a penalty for what some might argue is a preferred scenario. Just be good enough to go ahead earlier and stay ahead rather than letting the opponent hang around until it comes down to one possession.

That goes back to the simpler and arguably more meaningful 4th quarter "success vs. failure" measure. It just depends on whether - and how - you want to incorporate the idea of additional "clutchness" into what already filters out the first 3 quarters of play and non-close games entirely.

[ThunderDan]

Okay, so adjusting the formula to weigh Scenario 4 the same as Scenario 2 (2 points):

Rodgers career 4QCR = -0.2
Rodgers since mid-2010 = 0.95

Brady 4QCR = 0.60

So it looks like Rodgers' numbers are fantastic, but the Packers have suffered this type of loss in 6 out of 19 comeback opportunity games since mid-2010. Namely:

2010 MIA
2010 @ATL
2012 @IND
2012 @MIN
2013 SF playoff
2014 Game that shall not be named

In all of those games, the defense displayed total "unclutchness". In four of them, there was nothing the offense could've done to avoid what happened (scored the necessary TDs). In two of them, the offense had to settle for FGs.

Didn't Crosby clank the goal post on a game winning FG in regulation against MIA in 2010?

[ThunderDan]

Didn't Crosby clank the goal post on a game winning FG in regulation against MIA in 2010?

Nope, that was the Washington game.

[mraynrand]

The "best" score in this model would be 3.0 - if 100% of the QB's comebacks were successful and on the last possession of the game. The "worst" score would be -3.0 - if 100% of the QB's comeback attempts were unsuccessful, meaning the team never took a 4th Q lead in any situation in which it was down by one score or less in the 4th quarter.

Sharpe's comment about the impact of the weighting is true, which is the main reason I'm a bit skeptical about it. I'd tend to agree that, to the extent there's a value to "clutchness," the later in the game the comeback occurs the more "clutch" it is, but it incorporates a penalty for what some might argue is a preferred scenario. Just be good enough to go ahead earlier and stay ahead rather than letting the opponent hang around until it comes down to one possession.

That goes back to the simpler and arguably more meaningful 4th quarter "success vs. failure" measure. It just depends on whether - and how - you want to incorporate the idea of additional "clutchness" into what already filters out the first 3 quarters of play and non-close games entirely.

that helps. but it still needs a range, that is more data points - other QBs. Maybe TH87 should sell the App to footballoutsiders or footballfocus and earn tens of dollars.

[th87]

Interesting discussion. Correct me if I am wrong, but if you score early and often in the 4th quarter, you get lower rating under this metric. In the extreme case, a QB that scores 21 points in the 4th looks worse than one that struggles the entire quarter and throws one late TD.

I have no idea if that matters in the Rodgers vs Brady comparison, but I think the whole concept of "clutch" is suspect as a QB metric. This is still one of the best breakdowns.

Given that the metric measures one possession games in which the offense is behind, situations in which teams are purely trading scores all quarter, would be valued by what happens on the offense's last chance to take the lead (if it's there). If in this game, the offense scores (and wins) on the last possession, they are awarded 3 points. If it turns out that they needed one stop after their last score when time remaining is over 1:00, they get 2. And if on the team's last chance they don't score at all, in this situation, they'd get -1, because while they did get the lead at some point and lost it, they still had a chance to get that final score.

In the situation you describe, let's say the offense scores 21, thus going up by, say, 18. This would be dependent on defensive stops then, and while the offense did do an awesome job of scoring more, they are now out of the "come from behind" scenario right after their first score. They are awarded 1 point. The metric more values if-the-offense-doesn't-deliver-we're-screwed type situations, which means more pressure on the QB/offense, and thus, the more offensive "clutch" necessary. It's not perfect, certainly, though it still positively rewards the offense in that situation, but not as much as a "chips are down" situation, which is really what I attempted to measure.

[th87]

that helps. but it still needs a range, that is more data points - other QBs. Maybe TH87 should sell the App to footballoutsiders or footballfocus and earn tens of dollars.

If you're donating, I can make this my full time job. :)

(Working on Wilson now, but busy)

[MadScientist]

Here's what jumps out at me:
4. Losses where lead or tie was achieved, but the defense gave up the lead/tie with no chance to come back.
-Rodgers 7/35 (20%)
-Brady 3/68 (4%)

5. Losses where a lead was taken, but the lead was subsequently given up by the defense, but there was still enough time to win (> 1:00).
-Rodgers 4/35 (11%)
-Brady 3/68 (4%)

and the corollary
2/3 Wins where one or more defensive stop preserved the victory after a go-ahead score.
-Rodgers 7/35 (20%)
-Brady 22/68 (32%)


NE's defense doesn't choke like the Packers' defense too often does.

[sharpe1027]

Given that the metric measures one possession games in which the offense is behind, situations in which teams are purely trading scores all quarter, would be valued by what happens on the offense's last chance to take the lead (if it's there). If in this game, the offense scores (and wins) on the last possession, they are awarded 3 points. If it turns out that they needed one stop after their last score when time remaining is over 1:00, they get 2. And if on the team's last chance they don't score at all, in this situation, they'd get -1, because while they did get the lead at some point and lost it, they still had a chance to get that final score.

In the situation you describe, let's say the offense scores 21, thus going up by, say, 18. This would be dependent on defensive stops then, and while the offense did do an awesome job of scoring more, they are now out of the "come from behind" scenario right after their first score. They are awarded 1 point. The metric more values if-the-offense-doesn't-deliver-we're-screwed type situations, which means more pressure on the QB/offense, and thus, the more offensive "clutch" necessary. It's not perfect, certainly, though it still positively rewards the offense in that situation, but not as much as a "chips are down" situation, which is really what I attempted to measure.

I guess the main problem, more precisely, is that there is no difference in some of the same situations except what happens next. So, a QB can do precisely the same thing, in precisely the same pressure situation, but get different points depending on what the defense and opposing team do.

[th87]

I guess the main problem, more precisely, is that there is no difference in some of the same situations except what happens next. So, a QB can do precisely the same thing, in precisely the same pressure situation, but get different points depending on what the defense and opposing team do.

After equating Scenarios 2 (defense makes one stop after score) and 4 (defense allows score with no time left after score), there are no more situations (I don't believe) in which the QB is doing the same thing but getting different point values. If a go-ahead score requires more than one defensive stop to preserve, that means there was some higher amount of time left, which to me, means that it wasn't *as* high of a pressure situation as a last chance drive might be.

I'm open to modification suggestions though.

[sharpe1027]

After equating Scenarios 2 (defense makes one stop after score) and 4 (defense allows score with no time left after score), there are no more situations (I don't believe) in which the QB is doing the same thing but getting different point values. If a go-ahead score requires more than one defensive stop to preserve, that means there was some higher amount of time left, which to me, means that it wasn't *as* high of a pressure situation as a last chance drive might be.

I'm open to modification suggestions though.
Situation #1:
Score with 5 minutes left, defense gives up one 4:50 drive and no score. Offense kneels down to win. Result, 2 points.


Situation #2:
Score with 5 minutes left, defense holds with a 1:00 drive. Offense score again. Defense holds on next drive (or not). Result, 1 point (two defensive holds).

Both scores at 5:00 are identical. Situation #2 is at least as clutch as situation #1.
Maybe if the metric was per drive/opportunity rather than per game? Otherwise, the number of defensive stops can differ for identical go ahead situations.

[th87]

Situation #1:
Score with 5 minutes left, defense gives up one 4:50 drive and no score. Offense kneels down to win. Result, 2 points.


Situation #2:
Score with 5 minutes left, defense holds with a 1:00 drive. Offense score again. Defense holds on next drive (or not). Result, 1 point (two defensive holds).

Both scores at 5:00 are identical. Situation #2 is at least as clutch as situation #1.
Maybe if the metric was per drive/opportunity rather than per game? Otherwise, the number of defensive stops can differ for identical go ahead situations.

Maybe make it a 2 point value if the subsequent defensive stop results in another offensive score that now gives more than a one possession lead. This way, only one defensive stop was "needed".

[sharpe1027]

Maybe make it a 2 point value if the subsequent defensive stop results in another offensive score that now gives more than a one possession lead. This way, only one defensive stop was "needed".

That doesn't take into account differences due to the other team's drive time eating up more or less clock. How about weight the opportunities based on time left at the start of the drive? If you really wanted to get fancy, you could also weight based on starting field position using the expected score value from each starting position.

[Smidgeon]

The problem with advanced metrics is that there's always something else to consider. If we really wanted to go complex, each QBs "clutchness" would be weighed against the opposing QBs "clutchness" in each game. Is the defense trying to hold against Elway, Brady, or Manning? Or is the defense making a stand against Quinn, Gabbart, or Russell? That would affect things too.

Mind you, I'm not suggesting actually doing all that crazy work. But just highlighting that there's a point where you just have to summarize things.

Otherwise, very interesting statistics.

[pbmax]

There is also a problem of definition. Clutchness is such an broad excuse to dismiss and credit performance for reasons that may have mostly to do with outside factors that its easy to dismiss.

However, the "hot hand" concept, that streaks are not just statistical fluctuations, has been gaining ground after initially being dismissed by data types.

So you have to know what you are describing in order to be able to look at it analytically. Its a reason, as we have discovered in this thread, that 4QC is a problematic concept and gauge. Even the guy who started all this, Scott Kacsmar, admits we haven't narrowed down what exactly it is telling us about teams and the QB.

[th87]

That doesn't take into account differences due to the other team's drive time eating up more or less clock. How about weight the opportunities based on time left at the start of the drive? If you really wanted to get fancy, you could also weight based on starting field position using the expected score value from each starting position.

Yeah, that would be good, but more work than I can afford! I have to draw the line somewhere, and it would still be illustrative IMO, but with the understanding that it isn't perfect.

[th87]

The problem with advanced metrics is that there's always something else to consider. If we really wanted to go complex, each QBs "clutchness" would be weighed against the opposing QBs "clutchness" in each game. Is the defense trying to hold against Elway, Brady, or Manning? Or is the defense making a stand against Quinn, Gabbart, or Russell? That would affect things too.

Mind you, I'm not suggesting actually doing all that crazy work. But just highlighting that there's a point where you just have to summarize things.

Otherwise, very interesting statistics.

Thanks!

But yeah, we do have to draw the line somewhere.

[th87]

There is also a problem of definition. Clutchness is such an broad excuse to dismiss and credit performance for reasons that may have mostly to do with outside factors that its easy to dismiss.

However, the "hot hand" concept, that streaks are not just statistical fluctuations, has been gaining ground after initially being dismissed by data types.

So you have to know what you are describing in order to be able to look at it analytically. Its a reason, as we have discovered in this thread, that 4QC is a problematic concept and gauge. Even the guy who started all this, Scott Kacsmar, admits we haven't narrowed down what exactly it is telling us about teams and the QB.

True, but I suspect extrapolating this to all QBs will still tell us that Brady/Luck/Wilson are better than most, and will uncover a few surprises (like Rodgers after mid-2010). Before this, I didn't know that Rodgers during that time period would blow Brady out for his career (granted much smaller sample space).

[sharpe1027]

Yeah, that would be good, but more work than I can afford! I have to draw the line somewhere, and it would still be illustrative IMO, but with the understanding that it isn't perfect.

Can't fault you for that. I think I would lean toward a weighting that gave points relative tot the statistical average of points scored at the starting yard line for the NFL and then weighted from there based on a sliding scale that increased value as the time remaining decreased. But that is just my definition.

[vince]

True, but I suspect extrapolating this to all QBs will still tell us that Brady/Luck/Wilson are better than most, and will uncover a few surprises (like Rodgers after mid-2010). Before this, I didn't know that Rodgers during that time period would blow Brady out for his career (granted much smaller sample space).Yeah while not perfect and other variables exist which also discount the impact of a QB's clutchness on game outcomes, you can see the general picture much more clearly, which is really what matters. As Ayn suggested, more data points would allow for a more complete picture about who's better than who and by how much. But that's a ton of work obviously.

Thanks again for your effort on this th. The perception of Rodgers being "unclutch" persists among a lot of fans from the start of his career despite the reality over the last 4-5 years. Your analysis helps helps to break through the fog.

[woodbuck27]

Thoughts so far?

I havn't perused this thread beyond post # 6.

My first reaction:

WOW ! AND I'm very grateful for all the work/analysis you've done to compose this historic post on Packerrats.

Based on your work th87 we now have 'a model' to rank any NFL QB in history in terms of their 4QC prowess. That 'of course' pertinent as long as the game based data is available.

Somehow a mere 'Reputation Point' doesn't serve.

You certainly do deserve that and THANK YOU SO MUCH.

My name is Ed. . . . . woodbuck27.

[woodbuck27]

I'm not sure what to make of the formula th. It might be better to say that Rodgers was successful in 17 of the 35 instances and unsuccessful in 18. So he's 17-18 or .485 (that don't make the playoffs). Only 6 of Rodgers' 17 successes and 13 of Rodgers' 18 failures came in his first three years. So he's had 11 successes and 5 failures since. That's .687 since 2010. That's selective obviously but it's where one trend breaks into the opposite direction. And when you look at 2010 the trend changed direction in the middle of the year. All the successes occurred at the end of that year and all the failures happened in the beginning of the year.

So it's only 4 of Rodgers' successes happened before the midway point of 2010 and 16 of his 18 failures. He's 13 and 2 in 4th quarter comebacks since the halfway point of 2010. .866. That's pretty damn good.

Brady is 45-23 (.661) for his career. That could be the best ever overall.

I was expecting a challenge to th87's work. A constant and respected ingredient of Packerrats. :-)

It's interesting how statistics may be maneuvered to exclude this/that to skew something to fit any debate.


" Brady is 45-23 (.661) for his career. That could be the best ever overall." Vince

Therein lies the lead to examination.

Is that the case !? How does Tom Brady's 4QR prowess compare to the NFL leaders amongst in NFL history and 4QC's ?

http://www.pro-football-reference.com/leaders/comebacks_career.htm

and ...Now I'll review this entire thread.

[woodbuck27]

I like the different weights, with vince making a good point about an adjustment.

But the metric still is more about the team than the QB.

But I do think it hits on the issue that plagues M3's approach. I do not think this is a coincidence that Rodgers suffers along with the rest of the team in this area. He contributes (short passing is not top strength) but its not the only thing going on.

The problem with big plays to tie or win in this scenario is that they suffer in the comparison to longer, lengthier drives. If you score from 40 yards out, you will be leaving more time on the clock.

4QC's (Teams QB) !?

Isn't it any teams success in terms of any games roster on both sides of the ball and ST's?

Importantly whomever is calling plays on 'O' - 'D' and ST's in any comeback bid and success thereof.

Should we give so much credit to the QB?

Secondly:

I like th87's model because that member bases analysis of 4QC need (opportunity) and success or not; based on a measured and simple mathematical number system and resultant scenario.

[woodbuck27]

Edit............

Taking the ball out of your best players hands is the biggest mistake.

Yes.